

Hate Speech Through Identity Politics On Social Media Ahead Of The 2024 Presidential Election

Ujaran Kebencian Melalui Politik Identitas Di Media Sosial Pada Pemilu 2024

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Abstract

The debate surrounding the 2024 General Election in the virtual space, such as social media, has led netizens to exchange hate speech and heavy criticism regarding their respective support. Two groups have emerged: government supporters highlighting the successes of President Joko Widodo and those shifting their support to Anies Baswedan after Prabowo joined the government. Over time, this phenomenon has led to the proliferation of hate speech based on identities such as religion, ethnicity, and fanatical groups, potentially dividing public opinion. This study aims to explain the emergence of hate speech and the forms of hate speech based on identity politics leading up to the 2024 General Election. This study employs virtual ethnographic analysis (Virtual Ethnography) to observe tweets or statuses on selected accounts and the comments that arise from those tweets. The objects of analysis are the trends of words and phrases and the content within observed sentences or paragraphs. The research findings have been presented in the form of tabulation and categorization. The results show that comments and statuses containing hate speech always create bidirectional and multi-directional communication models among users. Hate speech often uses phrases and keywords that lead to insults, malicious accusations, curses, and accusing the opposing party of being stupid and evil. Based on this study, social media users must realize that the presidential campaign is a time to have different choices but remain aware of the same nation. Users need to develop an awareness of social media ethics. Enforcing rules against those who spread hate speech is key for every actor involved.

Keywords: identity politics, hate speech, 2024 Presidential Election, Twitter

Abstrak

Perdebatan Pemilihan Umum 2024 dalam ruang virtual seperti media sosial, telah membuat netizen bertukar ujaran kebencian dan kritik berat terkait dukungan masing-masing. Dua kelompok muncul yakni pendukung pemerintah yang menyoroti keberhasilan Presiden Joko Widodo dan mereka yang beralih dukungan ke Anies Baswedan setelah Prabowo bergabung dengan pemerintah. Semakin lama, fenomena ini berujung pada pelemparan ujaran kebencian berbasis identitas seperti agama, etnis, dan kelompok fanatik, yang berpotensi memecah belah opini masyarakat. Penelitian ini berupaya menjelaskan kemunculan ujaran kebencian dan bentuk-bentuk ujaran kebencian berbasis politik identitas menjelang Pemilu 2024. Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis etnografis pada ruang virtual (Etnografi Virtual) untuk mengamati cuitan atau status pada akun terpilih serta komentar yang muncul akibat dari cuitan tersebut. Objek analisis adalah tren kata dan frase serta konten dalam kalimat atau paragraf yang diamati. Hasil penelitian disajikan dalam bentuk tabulasi dan kategorisasi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa; komentar dan status yang berisi ujaran kebencian selalu memunculkan model komunikasi dua arah dan multi-arah di antara para pengguna. Ujaran kebencian yang dilemparkan banyak menggunakan frasa dan kata kunci yang mengarah pada penghinaan, tuduhan jahat, kutukan, dan menuduh pihak lawan sebagai bodoh dan jahat. Berdasarkan penelitian ini, pengguna media sosial harus menyadari bahwa kampanye pilpres adalah waktunya berbeda pilihan namun tetap sadar sebagai bangsa yang sama. Pengguna perlu membangun kesadaran mengenai etika bermedia sosial. Penegakan aturan terhadap pelemparan ujaran kebencian menjadi kunci bagi setiap pelaku.

Kata Kunci: politik identitas, Pemilihan Presiden 2024, ujaran kebencian, Twitter

Introduction

Only two years have passed since the 2019 General Election, but discussions regarding the 2024 General Election are already intense on social media, particularly on Twitter. Netizens engage in various hate speeches and critiques related to upcoming political issues. There are efforts by government supporters to promote the successes of President Joko Widodo. In contrast, other supporters, especially after Prabowo joined the administration, have started to support Anies Baswedan, the Governor of DKI Jakarta (Bajari, 2013, 2020; Bajari et al., 2021).

The increased hate speech on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter gained attention after the 2019 General Election. Users are easily provoked to respond with hate speech about government programs or specific issues. They frequently use harsh, derogatory, and provocative words against those with differing opinions (Coliver et al., 1992; Malmasi & Zampieri, 2017; Walker, 1996).

Statistically, there has been a significant rise in hate speech and hoaxes since the 2019 General Election and during the pandemic. Even from 2017-2018, leading up to the 2019 General Election, the number of hoax content and hate speech grew exponentially. Okezone.com noted that in 2017-2018, there were 643 genuine accounts, 702 semi-anonymous accounts, and 2,533 anonymous accounts involved in the spread of such content. The number of anonymous accounts rose by 100% in 2018 compared to the previous year, totaling only 733 (Fikri, 2019). CNN Indonesia

also reported that during July 2018, 13 hate speech content and politically tinged hoaxes spread across various online platforms (CNN Indonesia, 2019). Moreover, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology of Indonesia recorded that hoaxes, false news, and fake news became the primary triggers for hate speech, sharply increasing from 2018-2019. They successfully identified 486 cons during April 2019, with 1,731 hoaxes identified and validated from August 2018 to April 2019 (Kominfo, 2018, 2021). Hate speech often pertains to religious, belief, and ethnic identities, as seen in phrases like "kadrun," "monaslimin," "jongos peking," and "jembut onta." Predictions indicate that identity-based hate speech will continue to grow due to the polarization between pro-government and opposition after the 2019 Presidential Election.

Social media is utilized for political campaigns that build supporter loyalty and demean opponents. Reducing hate speech is essential for building a better democracy, but this is challenging because it relates to literacy in democracy and technology. The use of social media by pro-government and opposition influencers regarding the 2024 Presidential Election discourse has intensified conflicts and hate speech. Hate speech disseminated through social media spreads quickly due to the platform's ability to distribute content rapidly and widely.

Thus, efforts are necessary to control and monitor the spread of online hate speech, educate the public, and implement appropriate punishments. Given this background, this research aims to understand the form of identity politics discourse in the narrative of the 2024 Presidential Election in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic conveyed through hate speech by pro-government and opposition groups on Twitter. It will also seek the structure of identity politics discourse in that narrative and devise a model for conveying hate speech based on identity politics.

Based on this background, this paper attempts to dissect the objects of observation in status posts and comments from Twitter users on selected accounts. The explanation of the emergence of hate speech is organized based on the direction of communication among the users (commentators), classification of hate speech according to the purpose of conveying the speech, adjectives commonly used in hate speech as well as keywords for both groups of selected accounts, and the formulation of hate speech often thrown by the supporters.

Methods

This research is part of a study on mapping hate speech in the 2019 Elections, handling of Covid-19 in 2020, and the 2024 Elections. Much of the research has combined virtual space data analytic methods with Social Network Analysis (SNA), Virtual Ethnography, and trend analysis using Nvivo Analytics. The researchers strive to integrate quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or research process. First, the quantitative research method attempts to map and describe data trends, volume, and the frequency of hate speech discourse occurrences. Second, the qualitative method with an ethnographic exposition works to describe and elaborate on patterns, forms, and relationships of phrases and words in sentences and paragraphs of hate speech based on identity politics concerning the discourse of the 2024 Presidential Election. The combination of quantitative and

qualitative data analysis will provide a basis for developing a conceptual model of hate speech and identity politics in political discourse about the Presidential Election in Indonesia according to the thinking of pro-government and anti-government opposition groups.

Data collection was conducted using two approaches: firstly, extracting data from social media X (Twitter) using a social media comment and status exporting application at <https://exportcomments.com/>. The accounts and follower groups analyzed come from two groups of account owners: those who are part of government supporters and those in opposition to the government. The data analysis for this paper has utilized the Nvivo 12 Plus application and descriptive analysis to interpret the coding results from qualitative data into trends, graphics, and inferences of a data set with other data if needed.

Results and discussions

Hate speech is wholly defined as wording that results in violations against a particular group or community, referring to several definitions (Bajari, 2017; Bajari et al., 2019; Bajari & Kuswarno, 2020; Mondal et al., 2017; Neshkovska & Trajkova, 2017). Generally, hate speech attacks a group or community based on specific criteria, often characterized by demeaning gender, religion, race, and sexual orientation. Not stopping there, the boundaries of hate speech typically take the form of expressions that incite and justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and intolerance towards minority, backward, and migrant groups (Bajari, 2017; Bajari et al., 2019; Bajari & Kuswarno, 2020; Mondal et al., 2017; Neshkovska & Trajkova, 2017),

Social media plays a dominant role as a provider of hate speech expression space when a narrative in the form of statuses or threads in certain accounts spreads insulting sentences or strong criticisms against a particular group. Thus, social media is considered a very fertile space for the occurrence of hate speech (Bojarska, 2015).

The emergence of hate speech on social media cannot be separated from the role of particular account owners who first provoke or corner people, groups, ethnicities, genders, or specific organizations. Using phrases or keywords that attempt to demean, blaspheme, curse, label others as greedy, and even incite violent actions, those account owners lure others into expressing similar speech, either supportive or oppositional (Bajari et al., 2021, 2022; Salminen et al., 2018)

Observing the behavior of social media users in the 2019 presidential election, throwing high levels of hate speech, can also predict what will occur during the chosen government's tenure and approaching the 2024 presidential election. Using this strategy will trigger the use of group identity jargon or phrases to create divergent attitudes. However, these identity phrases often form extreme in-group and out-group attitudes, resulting in hostility (Amin et al., 2018).

The use of identity in political spaces in Indonesia is categorized as high. This is marked by court decisions that result in one of the gubernatorial candidates being entangled in legal issues due to utterances that offend a particular religious group, leading to a prison sentence (Anggraeny, 2017)

The Jakarta Governor election is a marker that the use of identity politics in Indonesia's local elections has triggered ethnic and group sentiments, often offending groups of ethnicity, religion, race, and streams or attacking individuals in their private space (Juditha, 2017b, 2017a). These sentiments are shown with hate speech phrases like "jongos China," "Anjing Peking," "Bani Kadrin," "penjual ayat mayat," "monaslimin," and others.

In jargon, political chants, or speeches, political identity expression is often followed by utterances using phrases or words that corner others. The situation becomes more apparent through social media like Facebook and Twitter (Rao, 2020). Therefore, it will trigger a war of hate speech based on the identity of a particular group in the local political arena (Goldberg, 2015; Tulkens, 2013).

Klaus Von Beyme (Dalglish, 2013; Seaman, 1996; Shahid, 200) mentions three characteristics inherent in identity politics. First, identity political movements fundamentally reconstruct the "large narrative" that is principally rejected and build a theory that controls biological factors as constituting differences in its life reality. Second, identity political movements tend to construct a reverse apartheid system. When power cannot be conquered, and power sharing is not achieved as a movement goal, separation, and self-exclusion are taken as an exit. Third, the weakness of identity political movements is the effort to create a specific group theory from science.

This study has selected tweet statuses on the designated account, including posts responding to the 2024 election that contain sarcasm, provocation, or promotion against a particular group based on race, ethnicity, belief, or religion, as the objects of observation.

The discussion begins with pro-government account groups, followed by anti-government or opposition account groups. In the pro-government account group, hate speech tweets that are content or identity politics-based are dominated by the @Dennysiregar7 account, followed by other accounts represented by one tweet status.

Government Account

A. Twit 1

The status on @GunRomli's account with a tweet reading, "Oh dear Aki Aos, not only calling Anies Baswedan as Imam Mahdi but also referring to Rocky Gerung as the Prophet, Messenger of God. Hopefully, the 'kadrin' will not scream about religious blasphemy 🙄" is a sarcastic remark about the presidential candidate that's buzzing in cyberspace. The tweet indicates a dislike for Anies Baswedan as a circulating presidential candidate, perceived as having blasphemed the religion because Aki Aos stated that Anies Baswedan is Imam Mahdi and Rocky Gerung as the Prophet, statements deemed inconsistent with Islamic beliefs. Pro-government followers mostly responded to the tweet with a dominant agreement on the post. For example, "@GunRomli 🙄🙄🙄 it is not Aki Aos that I am surprised by, but his followers, how do they think 🙄.. especially the servant who is hailed as Imam Mahdi, he is smart and intelligent.. but why does he nod like a fool.. 🙄 then sticking out his tongue, looks like a desert lizard licking its tongue 🙄" or "@GunRomli Religion Blasphemer." Then, "@GunRomli If 'kadrin' dare to say

religious blasphemy to that preacher, it means 'kadrun' is like Spitting Upwards 🤢🤢🤢🤢." Noticing the excerpted comments thrown that there is hatred for Anies Baswedan because a religious leader's statement is seen as inconsistent with Islamic beliefs.

Regardless, Gun Romli is a "player" who dislikes the Prabowo and Anies Baswedan faction. In the context of hate speech, these comments can be categorized as hate speech aimed at accusing others of wrongdoing, humiliating others with misconduct allegations, and inciting others to provide negative comments or view others negatively. If the classification is based on an overall assessment, it can be summarized in the following table.

Table 1. The Classification of Hate Speech (Pro-Government Account)

Classification	Description	Example from the Text
Accusation of Wrongdoing	Comments that directly accuse someone of doing something wrong or improper.	"@GunRomli Religion Blasphemer."
Humiliation through Accusation	Comments that not only accuse but also ridicule or belittle the person for the alleged wrongdoing.	"@GunRomli 🤢🤢🤢 it's not Aki Aoi that I'm surprised by, but his followers, how do they think 🤢..."
Incitement of Negative Comments or Negative Views	Comments that provoke or encourage others to give negative remarks or adopt negative views about someone.	"@GunRomli If 'kadrun' dare to say religious blasphemy to that preacher, it means 'kadrun' is like Spitting Upwards 🤢🤢🤢🤢."

Table 2. Use of Negative Adjectives in the Pro-Government's Twitter Account

Adjectives Group		Frequency		
No.		High	Moderate	Low
1	Stupid	V		
2	Disgusting		V	
3	Pathetic	V		
4	Ugly	V		
5	Greedy		V	
6	Retarded			V

B. Twit 2

Guntur Romli, a politician and legislative candidate from PDIP known as a staunch supporter of President Joko Widodo and Ganjar Pranowo, wrote a status on his Twitter account @GunRomli on August 14, 2023, stating, "Apparently, according to the law, political activities cannot be held at the Proclamation Manuscript Museum, but if Prabowo has his way, all can be overridden, let alone just rules, even activists were once abducted 😊. Can Prabowo declare his presidential candidacy at the Proclamation Museum?." The statement does not contain any hate speech, but it stirs public responses by channeling public sentiment filled with cynicism, especially from like-minded supporters.

In his statement, he criticized Prabowo Subianto, suggesting that Prabowo tends to disregard the rule of law, even to extreme actions like the abduction of activists. While the statement does not explicitly contain hate speech, phrases like "all can be overridden" and "even activists were once abducted" can be seen as a sharp and belittling insinuation. The statement seems intended to elicit an adverse reaction from Prabowo Subianto's supporters or sympathizers. Many Jokowi supporters responded to this tweet with hate speech against the pro-Prabowo camp. Some include: (1) "He is just a presidential candidate, and he is already breaking the law, what more if he is in power. Do not choose a candidate like this." (2) "Exactly like the former governor of DKI who played by his own rules AND legislations when in power... PEOPLE LIKE THIS should not be given power if we do not want this country to be ruined by his authoritarian tendencies and DO-WHAT-I-WANT attitude!" (3) "In Indonesia, they are called 'kadrun'; in the US, they would be 'kadtramp'."

In short, the statement conveyed through Guntur Romli's tweet can be understood as an attempt to mock Prabowo's supporters where there is no solid evidence, especially regarding past abduction cases. The context of the tweet can be categorized as hate speech. It can be classified as hate speech oriented as insults and accusations of wrongdoing to others or other groups, trying to belittle others/groups with allegations of evil deeds, and leading others to comment negatively or perceive other parties negatively or provocatively.

Comments from the pro-government group triggered reactions or comments from others with different political views. Observations indicate that the tweet made by Guntur Romli sparked various negative responses from some parties who felt provoked. These responses include hate speech, name-calling, and demeaning attitudes as retaliation against Guntur Romli's statement. As a politician, Guntur Romli should consider using more polite language and tone to promote more constructive and civilized discussions.



Figure 1: A Twit of @GunRomli on Twitter

It is important to emphasize that in the often polarized environment of social media and politics, comments or tweets that have a cynical tone or sharply criticize another party tend to provoke strong reactions from the supporters of the concerned party. This pattern can worsen the atmosphere of political discussion and hinder the possibility of a healthy and constructive dialogue between various community groups. Therefore, choosing words wisely and creating space for civilized and quality discussions is crucial, even when holding different political views.

C. Twit 3

HukumDan: “Whoa!!! Turns out the narrative of Ganjar's supporters @ganjarpranowo is insanely cruel and savage. All of them have gutter minds”. The statement conveyed by the Twitter account @HukumDan, as shown in image three above, reads “Whoa!!! Turns out the narrative of Ganjar's supporters @ganjarpranowo is insanely cruel and savage. They all have gutter minds.” The tweet mentions the Twitter account belonging to the presidential candidate of the Ganjar Pranowo party, who previously stated in one of Deddy Corbuzier's podcasts, that he enjoys watching adult films. This statement shocked the public, especially with his added remark, “What is wrong with that?.” The tweet from the @HukumDan account was triggered by two tweets from the accounts @MubarakRifani and @aryabiput.



Figure 3: Tweet from the Twitter Account @HukumDan



Figure 4: A tweet from @MubarakRifani triggered a response from @HukumDan.

Briefly, Denny Siregar's tweet is a response to previous statements made by Mubarak Rifai and Arya. In the context of hate speech, the tweet from the account @HukumDan consists of elements of hate speech and provocative ideas. It incites or belittles other individuals or groups, encourages others to engage in similar acts of hatred, directly accuses other individuals/groups of malicious actions, and holds negative prejudices against others. The tweet is perceived as provocative and contains incitement, leading others to comment on the body-shaming remarks against Ganjar Pranowo, with enticing phrases such as "gutter minds" and "pig." These can be interpreted as insults or physical harassment towards individuals who are short and overweight.

Table 3. The Illustration of Hate Speech (Pr-Government Account)

Aspect	Explanation
Context	Denny Siregar's tweet is a response to previous statements by Mubarak Rifai and Arya.
Nature of the Statement	The tweet from the account @HukumDan contains elements of hate speech and provocative statements.
Incitement or Insult to Individual/Group	The tweet incites or belittles other individuals or groups.
Direct Accusation	Directly accuses other individuals/groups of malicious actions.
Negative Prejudice	Holds negative prejudices against others.
Provocative Nature	The tweet is seen as provocative and contains elements of incitement.
Body Shaming Remarks	Comments on body-shaming remarks against Ganjar Pranowo, such as "gutter minds" and "pig," can be seen as insults or physical harassment towards individuals who are short and overweight.

Opposition Account

The status posted on the timeline of the account belonging to "Hilmi28" attempts to comment that the flooding problem in Jakarta would be more easily addressed if Anies Baswedan became President in 2024. This statement is made in

a context unrelated to responding to news or announcements from those who support Jokowi's government. However, the "Hilmi28" account tends to oppose Jokowi's administration. Given Hilmi28's position as a supporter of Anies Baswedan, this status essentially indicates a comparison that one side is better than the other, suggesting Anies Baswedan is superior to Jokowi, particularly in terms of addressing Jakarta's flood problem.

A tweet reading, "The flooding in Jakarta will, God willing, be easier to handle if Mr. @aniesbaswedan becomes President in 2024. Agree or not?" is not a hate speech. Still, it aims to elicit public responses with a hint of sarcasm, especially from like-minded supporters. There are several comments in support and with a tinge of sarcasm against those who disagree or oppose, which tend to corner Jokowi's administration. For instance, some words mock and belittle Jokowi or those on his side.

Several comments support and have a hint of sarcasm towards those who disagree or oppose, aiming to corner a particular party, in this case, Jokowi's administration. For example, "If it could be expedited, Tadz, I cannot stand the current situation anymore," or "Do not follow Jokowi." There are also derogatory and belittling comments, such as, "Wasn't he the clueless one 🤔😏? He used to promise that way." or "I disagree, do not equate AB with Pinocchio." There are also comments containing provocations like "the cebongs of the same school can just keep soaking" or "But I heard there is someone recklessly wanting a third term; please inform so he knows his place." All of which belittle and mock both Jokowi and those on his side. Then there are accusations criticizing Jokowi's administration for being perceived as dishonest and ineffective during their term, like, "Ah, he might end up like someone who can only deceive and has made no progress in 6 years."

However, there are also contradictory/disagreeing comments against this anti-Jokowi sentiment. These comments are belittling because they assume the flood narrative Anies Baswedan's supporters used is just a promise since the flood issue in Jakarta remains unresolved. For instance, "Someone said the same thing before, why repeat the same narrative? Only a fool falls into the same hole" or "It is a shame, sir. Do not make promises when the past ones are like that 😏" or "I think we should not repeat the same old promises."

More specifically, there are contradictory comments against the statement supporting Anies Baswedan, commenting on how Anies Baswedan managed the floods during his tenure, like, "Ahhh. Mr. Anies has been governor for two terms; does he need a third term to handle the flood? Those 13 major rivers should be his responsibility; what did he do with those rivers? Should the central government take responsibility? The central government is so sadly."

In the context of hate speech, such comments can be classified as hate speech oriented towards accusations of wrongdoing, belittling others with allegations of hostility, and leading others to comment negatively or perceive another party negatively. The distribution of derogatory phrases on Twitter and the forms of hate speech are summarized in two tables.

Table 4. Use of Negative Adjectives in the Opposition's Twitter Account

No.	Adjectives Group	Frequency		
		High	Moderate	Low
1	Stupid		V	
2	Disgusting			V
3	Pathetic	V		
4	Ugly		V	
5	Greedy	V		V
6	Retarded			V

Table 5. The Classification of Hate Speech (Opposition's Account)

No.	The Hate Speech Form	Kemunculan Penyampaian		
		High	Moderate	Low
1	Humiliation	V		
2	Accusation of wrongdoing		V	
3	Cursing/scolding unclearly			V
4	Considering someone as stupid/demeaning	V	V	
5	Labeling negatively			V

Based on the description from the qualitative data snippet of each status or tweet in the observed account, the content dominantly attacks the opposition, including figures representing the opposition. The main topic of the 2024 presidential election is increasingly being discussed. The 2024 presidential election will likely feature figures like Prabowo, Anies Baswedan, Habib Rziq Shihab, and Novel Baswedan from the opposition, drawing significant attention from the pro-government party.

The main issue for the 2024 Presidential Election is becoming a primary topic of discussion. The 2024 Presidential Election will likely feature figures like Prabowo, Anies Baswedan, Habib Rziq Shihab, and Novel Baswedan from the opposition, leading the pro-government party to pay significant attention to these figures. They do not hesitate to label these figures with derogatory names, make false accusations, or call them bad names, such as "warga kampret," "Karun," human rights violators, pufferfish, Pa Kumis, and Bang Thoyib. In Bamukmin, there are derogatory terms and slurs aimed at these figures.

Upon observation, narratives based on identity are not used to attack the government or pro-Jokowi groups. No expressions or terms are associated with the context of ethnicity, sect, or a particular ideological group. Even though the term "communism" appears, it is not dominantly articulated or combined with words in sentences to attack a specific party. Identification with a particular ideological group is directed at the President, suggesting he has claws and a red star for the children.

Attacks on the pro-government group or the government mainly target specific identities related to Mr. Jokowi's life. Terms like "cebong", "cebong bipang", and "brainless" are general terms or other terms that have no connection with identity, such as "corruptor," "scoundrel," "wretched human," and others.

Conclusion

Hate speech has established bidirectional and multi-directional communication models on social media, employing unpolished and vile language. This conclusion was particularly evident among the supporters' group of candidates in the 2019 Presidential Election. However, the core discourse remained focused on mutual animosity, instigation, insult, and degradation based on ethnicity, religion, race/ethnicity, and gender. Hate speech is characterized by using foul and rough words and terms that demean and depict others as greedy and backward.

On Twitter, hate speech also emerged in the context of the 2024 Presidential Election and became content disseminated by both government supporters and the opposition. Phrases and keywords used in hate speech include insults, malicious accusations, curses, and calling the opposing party stupid or evil. The process of spreading information on social networks is vital to understanding ambiguous information and preventing the dissemination of negative messages. Consequently, a good understanding of information and the ability to adapt effectively within organizations can vary significantly depending on the context.

The trend of increasing hate speech leading up to the 2024 Elections is undeniable. Indeed, hate speech does not always occur only during significant political events but also almost daily in virtual spaces like social media. The evidence from this research recommends a holistic approach requiring all parties, such as social media users, owners, political elites, and community leaders, to uphold ethics in communicating in public spaces like social media. In addition, increasing literacy about communication technology and strategic issues in the virtual space is crucial for building civility in communication through social media. Moreover, enforcing rules for those or users who commit violations in the form of hate speech is a strategic step in fostering good and beneficial social media attitudes and behaviors.

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